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including the virtual impossibility of
failing students for any reason. Wiarda
was told, as all PME faculty have been
for years, that the students were his
peers, an assertion that Wiarda found
“laughable.” Nor was it true. Wiarda
shows that the students were actually
treated as his superiors and that he was
expected to serve them accordingly.
Academics, for their part, have no
understanding of the military obsession
with hierarchy and procedure—also a
point Wiarda mentions. Yet in this toobrief volume, the author does not explore either culture as much as his title
promises. Too much space is taken up
with anecdotes and score settling at the
expense of discussing remedies, the stories and problems being presented without priority. In one example, Wiarda is
absolutely right to decry the often sadistic manipulation of faculty contracts
by some of the martinets for whom he
worked. This is a widespread problem
in the PME world. More time discussing
the pressing need for a tenure system
in PME, however, and less complaining
about distractions (like student parking) might have been more productive.
There are other problems with the
book as well. Although short, it is
poorly edited—indeed, it seems not
to have been edited at all. The same
anecdotes appear again in different
places, sections overlap, and there are
avoidable lapses in grammar and spelling. An entire chapter, about Wiarda’s
international travels while working for
NDU, is out of place and disposable.
Nonetheless, the book’s flaws do not
obscure the reality of the problem.
Successful and highly regarded educators from every major PME institution
—including George Reed, Dan Hughes,
Judith Stiehm, and Joan Johnson-Freese,
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among others—have stepped forward
and written about the same issues.
While Wiarda’s narrative is flawed in
tone, it is still an important step in
illuminating serious and continuing
problems in the PME community.
THOMAS NICHOLS

Naval War College

Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805–1927.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011. 345pp.
$120

This book explores the history of the
development of naval policy making
in the British Admiralty from 1805
to 1927, from the Battle of Trafalgar
to the aftermath of World War I.
The author, C. I. Hamilton, a professor of modern European history at the
University of the Witwatersrand, writes
that he first became interested in this
subject because he wished to know who
did what at the Admiralty and how
they did it. Reading this book answers
those questions and introduces a rich
tapestry of interesting historical characters and complex naval policy issues.
Although the book paints an analytically cohesive picture of naval policy
issues that plagued would-be planners
for over a century, it also contains many
colorful historical details. Beginning
in 1805 with Lord Barham, who at
age eighty could run the navy almost
single-handedly from his desk, the book
deals authoritatively with thorny issues
of naval administration and policy.
Many fascinating professional and
civilian characters appear in this period.
Only naval historians may initially recognize some, but there are many other
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individuals who are well known, such as
Benjamin Disraeli, William E. Gladstone,
Winston Churchill, and Sea Lords John
Fisher and John Jellicoe. The Admiralty
was consistently an important department of the British government, but it
was never a guaranteed stepping-stone
for a First Lord to prime ministerial
power. Churchill’s elevation in 1940
to prime minister arose from political
considerations other than his having
been a First Lord of the Admiralty.
The book illustrates how difficult it was
during most of this period for any First
Lord and his professional naval advisers
to develop policy and administer a farflung navy at the same time. Although
day-to-day administrative matters
almost always consumed attention,
policy usually was made under crisis
and only when it was demonstrably
required, often without the benefit of
any long period of careful examination. Personalities rather than processes
usually drove its development, until the
Admiralty finally agreed to the establishment of a permanent apparatus of
policy making based on good record
keeping. This important part of the
machinery of government was especially
necessary in times of rapid technological change and various financial crises.
Its effective achievement did not, however, come to fruition until the 1920s.
To assist in understanding these developments, the author has included useful
appendixes. One sets out the names of
the First Lords and naval professionals in the Admiralty. Another is a list
of acronyms. Interspersed throughout
the book are tables, which, for example,
show the duties of the Lords and the
structure of the Admiralty over time.
Naval historians will appreciate this
well-researched and well-written
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and scholarly work, but even those
without a detailed knowledge of
the period will discover it to be an
informative and agreeable read.
K. D. LOGAN

Ottawa, Ontario

Hillenbrand, Laura. Unbroken: A World War II
Story of Survival, Resilience and Redemption. New
York: Random House, 2010. 473pp. $27

Although not a historian, Laura
Hillenbrand is an accomplished researcher and storyteller. In Unbroken
she chronicles one individual’s tale of
“the greatest generation,” revealing how
war, particularly the Second World War,
spun the lives of common, and not-socommon, individuals out of control and
set them on trajectories that would otherwise have never occurred. It is also a
tale of extraordinary endurance, incredible luck (both good and bad), and what
can only be termed a remarkable ability
to forgive immeasurable wrongdoings.
Unbroken is the story of Louie
Zamperini, a remarkable man who
was, in succession, a streetwise “tough
kid,” an Olympian, an Army Air Corps
bombardier, an air-crash survivor, a
Japanese POW, a veteran who suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder, and
a born-again Christian. That he survived the war is incredible; that he lived
to forgive his captors is unbelievable.
At the most basic level Unbroken is
a classic “gripping yarn.” The story’s
drama is all the more compelling
because the adventures, perils, and
triumphs are factual. Zamperini did
run in the 1936 Olympics, on the same
team as Jesse Owens. He spent fortyseven days in a life raft, covering more
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